Johann Rehberger 披露 Claude Code Opus 5 Auto Mode 的提示注入绕过

突破Claude Code Opus 5自动模式

乔木风格重写（向阳乔木 · deepseek-v4-flash）：Anthropic 对 Claude Code 的 auto mode 寄予厚望，最近还把它设成了默认模式，并声称它能有效防御提示注入攻击。但 Johann Rehberger 给出了一个反例：他找到的攻击方式，成功率高达 80%。 这个攻击的路径很有意思。攻击者诱骗 Claude Code 下载并解压一个 zip 压缩包。压缩包里藏着一个名为 struct...

Breaking Claude Code Opus 5 Auto Mode

Breaking Claude Code Opus 5 Auto Mode Anthropic are putting a great deal of faith in Claude Code's auto mode for protecting their coding agent users against prompt injection attacks. They recently made that the default and have made bold claims about its effectiveness. Johann Rehberger is one of the most credible prompt injection researchers active today. He found an attack against auto mode which he claims works 80% of the time, by tricking Claude Code into downloading and uncompressing a zip archive, then executing code that imports base64 without noticing that this will import and execute a local struct.py file extracted from the archive. In a few cases auto mode directly prevented the agent from preventing harmful code from continuing to execute! In a few runs Claude tried to terminate the malware process once it noticed the compromise, but Auto Mode denied the cleanup command. Claude detects the compromise, but Auto Mode blocks its cleanup command The safety mechanism itself can become part of the failure. The classifier allowed the creation of the malware process, but then it blocked the command intended to stop it! I agree with Johann's conclusion here: the only safe way to run agents if there's any risk of attracting the attention of an adversarial attack is with a sandbox: Run unattended coding agents in a container, VM or OS sandbox. Restrict network egress. Monitor your agents. Do not expose home directories, SSH keys, cloud credentials,… to the agent runtime. [...] Tags: sandboxing, security, ai, prompt-injection, generative-ai, llms, anthropic, claude, johann-rehberger, claude-code